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**THE STATE PLANS AND REPUBLIC PROGRAMS:
A Contribution to the Examination of the Political Economy of
Yugoslav Socialism during the Decentralization Period
(1965-1983)**

Abstract: *This paper aims to illustrate the constant quest of the leadership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for an effective economic policy after 1965 and to provide an answer, among other things, to the question of how much the projected economic decentralization due to reform measures contributed to overall socio-political dispersion. Faced with serious financial and economic challenges, the state leadership sought to find a model that would keep them on ideologically defined tracks while also allowing for breadth and integration into global economic currents. In these efforts, the general geopolitical position of Yugoslavia as a country that remained “somewhere in between” by the agreement of major powers after Second World War was reflected, thus best illustrating the historical destiny of the entire Balkan Peninsula, especially the area predominantly inhabited by South Slavs. To explain the topic as a materialized concept and to question it in this way, works of authors who dealt with the political economy of Yugoslavia as both creators and critics were used.*

Using the example of the implementation of autonomous economic policy by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elite during this period, the aim is to open up space for critical thinking about the actual possibilities and roles of the republics, and to try to discern whether they could truly be fully independent in their economic programs. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced economic momentum alongside overall social transformation during this period, the actions of its political leadership did not always encompass all economic flows of the republic through their actions and planning. This is most vividly evidenced by well-known examples of economic manipulation behind which central authorities (so-called “guardians and

executors of the revolution”) stood, and which were subsequently abused before and during the disappearance of the common state.

In this regard, an overview of the development of the idea of self-management by Yugoslav ideologues is provided, the phases of ideological development are presented, as well as the difficulties faced by the concept itself, and the independent political course of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political leadership, or the overall socio-political context in which “independence” began to be practiced. Specifically concerning the position of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elite towards reforms, a quite interesting detail was noticed. Namely, although a high level of decentralization was achieved through constitutional amendments (1968-1971) and clearly defined separate republican markets, decisions were made differently at the level of the Federation, i.e., in its remaining functions. By outvoting. Taking this into account, a conclusion naturally emerged and set the development of the self-management economic system between the utopian aspirations of ideologues and the realpolitik actions of party and military hawks, which then created significant cracks within the system and favored the emergence of gray areas whose existence partly generated the great economic crisis during the 1980s.

Key words: *Yugoslavia, political economy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, reform, self-management, crisis.*

DRŽAVNI PLANOVI I REPUBLIČKI PROGRAMI: Prilog razmatranju političke ekonomije jugoslavenskog socijalizma u periodu decentralizacije (1965-1983)

Apstrakt: *U ovom radu se nastoji prikazati konstantu potragu vrhuške Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) za efikasnom ekonomskom politikom nakon 1965. godine i dati odgovor, između ostalog, i na pitanje koliko je projektovana ekonomska decentralizacija uslijed reformskih zahvata vodila ukupnoj društveno-političkoj disperziji. Državni vrh suočen sa ozbiljnim financijskim i ekonomskim izazovima pokušavao je pronaći model koji bi ih ostavio na ideološki zadatim tračnicama, a opet istom tom modelu dati širinu i uključivanje u svjetske ekonomske tokove. U ovim naporima, dakako, zrcalila se i opća geopolitička pozicija Jugoslavije kao zemlje koja je dogovorom velikih sila nakon Drugog svjetskog rata ostala “negdje između” na taj način najbolje ocrtavajući i historijsku sudbinu čitavog Balkanskog poluotoka, a posebno prostora dominantno naseljenog Južnim Slavenima. Da bi se tema objasnila kao materijalizirani koncept i kao takvog ga se propitalo korištena su djela autora koji su se bavili političkom ekonomijom Jugoslavije kako kreatori ali i kao kritičari.*

Na primjeru provođenja autonomne ekonomske politike od strane bosanskohercegovačke političke elite tokom ovog perioda cilj je otvoriti prostor za kritičko razmišljanje o stvarnim mogućnostima i ulogama republika, odnosno pokušati dokučiti da li su u ekonomskim programima iste doista mogle biti u potpunosti nezavisne. Iako je Bosna i Hercegovina u ovome periodu doživljavala, pored ukupnog društvenog preobražaja, i ekonomski zalet njen politički vrh nije uvijek i u svim slučajevima svojim djelovanjem i planiranjem obuhvatao ukupne privredne republičke tokove. Tome najzornije svjedoče poznati primjeri privredne manipulacije iza koje su stajali i presudnu ulogu imali centralni autoriteti (može se reći “čuvari i izvođači revolucije”), a koji su potom zloupotrijebljeni pred i tokom nestanka zajedničke države.

S tim u vezi dat je presjek razvoja ideje samoupravljanja od strane jugoslavenskih ideologa, predstavljene su faze idejnog razvoja kao i poteškoće sa kojima se koncept kao takav suočavao, a obrađena je i nezavisni politički kurs bosanskohercegovačkog političkog vrha, odnosno ukupni društveno-politički kontekst u kojem se “nezavisnost” počela upražnjavati. Kada se konkretno govori o poziciji bosanskohercegovačke političke elite prema reformama primijećen je i jedan dosta zanimljiv detalj. Naime, iako je ustavnim amandmanima (1968-1971) postignut visok nivo decentralizacije te jasno definirana razdvojena republička tržišta, na nivou Federacije tj. u onim njenim preostalim funkcijama odlučivalo se, ipak, na drugi način. Preglasavanjem. Uzimajući ovo u obzir i zaključak se sam po sebi nametnuo i postavio razvoj ekonomskog sistema samoupravljanje između utopističkih težnji ideologa i real-političkih djelovanja partijskih i vojnih jastrebova što je potom pravile značajne pukotine unutar sistema i pogodovalo nastanku sivih zona čije će postojanje djelom generirati i veliku ekonomsku krizu tokom osamdesetih godina.

Ključne riječi: Jugoslavija, politička ekonomija, Bosna i Hercegovina, reforma, samoupravljanje, kriza.

Introduction

From the mid-1960s onwards, several key socio-political processes unfolded for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Economic innovations, liberalization, and constitutional reforms spiced up the political scene in all republics, and largely due to these transformative processes, there were a series of political reckonings – the Ranković affair in 1966, the crushing of the Croatian Spring (maspok) in 1971 in the SR Croatia, the removal of Serbian liberals from the political scene in the SR Serbia, and in the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ousting of the “old revolutionary guard” (Humo,

Karabegović, and others). Certain party leaders subsequently spoke about these events as a halted process of democratization.¹

Economic currents were also at an impasse, which became evident in the first half of the sixties, necessitating the definition of a new approach. By the end of 1964, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY) reached political consensus on the foundations of a new approach in economic reform at the 8th Congress. Interestingly, what this should fundamentally entail became apparent when, in mid-1965, a delegation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiated a financial arrangement with the "Kraigher Commission" (Boris Kraigher 1914-1967), approving a credit (of 80 million US dollars) for an economic reform in socialist countries for the first time.²

Five years of wandering and exploration eventually led to the implementation of new economic reform measures during the period from 1971 to 1976. The introduced innovations began to be systematically applied, and on the macroeconomic level, policy coordination mechanisms were supposed to strengthen planning instruments. "Social agreements," agreements concluded at various levels between representatives of political authorities (referred to as 'socio-political communities' in Yugoslav terminology), trade unions, enterprises, and other organizations, were meant to define policies in specific fields such as prices, income distribution, employment, foreign trade, etc.³

Yugoslavia's increasing indebtedness coincided with the onset of reform processes and the beginning of Džemal Bijedić's tenure as the head of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in 1971.⁴ Although these were not excessive debts but rather minor financial injections aimed at ensuring the functioning of the economy and reducing damage due to the difficulties of the economic reform initiated in 1965, this fact did not bode well. It could be concluded that poor strategies, and consequently implementation, led to stagnation in the Yugoslav economy.⁵ However, global economic trends, particularly the oil crisis of 1973, significantly limited Bijedić's stabilization efforts, making indebtedness inevitable.

Yugoslavia experienced its highest level of indebtedness in the period from 1976 to 1985, reaching 22 billion dollars by the end of 1987, which represented a massive burden for a country already in a severe economic crisis.⁶ The reorientation linked to constitutional changes shifted the focus of decision-

¹ Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945- 2005*, Zagreb 2006, 121.

² Bogomir Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma – od europeizacije Jugoslavije do balkanizacije današnjeg EU-a*, *Politička misao*, god. 49, br. 3, Zagreb 2012, 77.

³ Milica Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia. The long transition to a market economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 7.

⁴ Ibrahim Latifić, *Jugoslavija 1945-1990*, Beograd 2001, 32.

⁵ Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija SFRJ. Glavni procesi 1918-1985*, Zagreb, 1985, 316.

⁶ I. Latifić, *Jugoslavija 1945-1990*, 33.

making, programming, and economic management to the republics.⁷ Decentralization occurred, which in the first half of the seventies, at least superficially, yielded certain results. However, the Law on Associated Labor (LAL), proclaimed in 1976 as one of the key moments of societal restructuring, turned economic currents in a negative direction.⁸

Contributing to this was influential local politics. The preservation of the social contract was defended by local elites who demanded high levels of autonomy in exchange for their loyalty. This led to inefficiency but also to the development of a significant informal economic sector. In his study, Stilhoff Sørensen quotes Carl-Ulrik Schierup, who believes that the combination of market reforms from the 1960s and constitutional reforms from 1974 had a fragmenting effect on the Yugoslav economy and society (retraditionalization of society and emphasis on clientelist networks), creating an unfavorable climate for development.⁹

The credit funds that flowed into Yugoslavia from 1971 to 1987 were mostly used for oil imports, which were 6.2 times higher than in the period from 1945 to 1970. Kiro Gligorov, a high-ranking Yugoslav politician and later the first president of independent Macedonia, vividly explained how the enormous and rapid indebtedness occurred. Yugoslavia's debt, which stood at \$1.5 billion in 1972, skyrocketed to \$18 billion in 1980 due to the Serbian Finance Minister Petar Kostić taking a loan of \$1 billion for the Smederevo Steelworks without the consent of the Federation. When other republics found out about this, they began to do the same.¹⁰

In fact, until then, the system of mobilization and distribution of investment funds had been directed in a centralized manner through state investment funds, so there was no need for incentives for enterprise-level investment. However, after the reform, the desire to introduce a market-oriented system necessitated the creation of new mechanisms to encourage enterprises to invest and efficiently distribute capital. When emerging republican oligarchies and their appetites were involved, the result was as such.

Difficulties were certainly unavoidable during the time of state and societal restructuring. The data showing a 47% increase in the number of people seeking employment in 1968 compared to 1964 supported this.¹¹ An additional problem was the increasing social disparities between developed and less developed regions of the country, especially pronounced after 1966.¹² The visibility of significant regional differences in the overall economic structure

⁷ Grupa autora, *Istorija Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine*, knjiga 2, Sarajevo 1990, 228.

⁸ Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Četvrtе Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2003, 214.

⁹ Jens Stilhoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery. Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo*. New York – Oxford 2009, 132.

¹⁰ D. Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza*, 209.

¹¹ D. Bilandžić, *Historija SFRJ*, 318.

¹² D. Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla*, 215-216.

and level of development revealed a correlation with national demographic factors, which became a major political problem. The movements recorded (economic stagnation, employment difficulties, and relatively low personal incomes) also contributed to a significant emigration of workers abroad.

The negative trend from 1965 to 1979 was quite evident, but consumerism, which was thriving in Yugoslavia, distorted reality and created the illusion of prosperity.¹³ Official policy, in its development concept and in addressing economic problems and unemployment, considered the emigration of the working population to Western European countries. This social group began to play a significant role in socio-political movements in the second half of the seventies due to their numbers and financial potential.

After the difficulties of the mid-sixties reforms and the challenges of the first half of the seventies, the Yugoslav economy began to decline in 1979.¹⁴ Economists had already warned of a possible catastrophe for the Yugoslav economy during this period, emphasizing the need for reevaluation to find alternative and better solutions.¹⁵ Analyzing investment trends over two decades (1960-1980), Uvalić concluded that by the late 1970s, the level of investment exceeded the potential of domestic savings in the Yugoslav economy. The failure to control overall investment, particularly in the second half of the seventies, had significant implications for macroeconomic stability and balance of payments performance.

The expansionary policy increasingly relied on foreign borrowing, leading to the aforementioned rapid growth of external debt by 1980 (almost \$18 billion) and a record deficit in foreign trade and the current account in 1979.¹⁶ After the death of Josip Broz Tito, a series of political fronts opened up, and relatively quickly, due to major economic and social difficulties, the "Kraigher Commission" (Sergej Kraigher 1914-2001) was re-established, which in 1983 created the Long-Term Program for Economic Stabilization (LPES).¹⁷ The stabilization program involved narrowing investment activities throughout the country, indirectly demonstrating the depth of the crisis.¹⁸ The lack of working capital was evidence of poverty and the limitations of the national economy, which was precisely what the Yugoslav economy lacked.

The implementation of the Stabilization Program began under Milka Planinc, the President of the SIV, known as the "Iron Lady" of Yugoslavia, who served as head of the Federal Government from 1982 to 1986. Not much was achieved during her tenure except for the determination of the country's actual debt, while reform efforts were interrupted in 1985 when the faction in the LCY

¹³ *Ibidem*, 222.

¹⁴ Marijan Korošić, *Jugoslavenska kriza*, Zagreb 1989, 55.

¹⁵ Branko Horvat, *Ekonomika brzog razvoja*, knjiga 1, Sarajevo 2001, 124.

¹⁶ M. Uvalić, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 69-70.

¹⁷ M. Korošić, *Jugoslavenska kriza*, 69.

¹⁸ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, *Izbor iz dokumenata SK Bosne i Hercegovine*, knjiga 6, Sarajevo 1983, 13.

accusing Planinc of disadvantaging underdeveloped republics through market orientation won.¹⁹

The Political Economy of the “Buffer Zone”: Self-Management in Theory and Practice

Over a span of about forty years (1945-1989), Yugoslavia and its builders sought to develop a model of socialism based on workers' self-management, decentralization, social ownership, and increasing reliance on the market and market economy. Because of these characteristics, Yugoslavia was rightfully considered very different from other socialist economies. Due to the theory of managing companies by workers and due to the economic inefficiency of the Yugoslav economy, blame was placed on the specifics of this economic system.²⁰

During the 1950s, self-management developed on anti-Soviet ideological principles, only to later become a tool to justify a shift towards the West in the already planned integration into the global market. These two phases can be clearly distinguished.²¹ Rudolf Bićanić, a Croatian theorist and politician, proposed a slightly different division in his considerations (three periods: 1. 'centralized planning' from 1947 to 1951, 2. 'decentralized planning' from 1952 to 1964, 3. 'polycentric planning' after 1965).²² Bićanić's model suggests that there was internal reform pressure for further decentralization (1952-1964), but this proved to be only a disguised form of centralized planning and thus just one, initial, phase.

Therefore, the first phase represents an experiment with a centralized planning system (with depressive economic results), while the second aimed for a system of self-management in a highly decentralized federation, which led to the mentioned inefficiency and even the impossibility of reforming macroeconomic policy. Part of the difficulty lay in the inherent contradiction between, on the one hand, the need for central authority to ensure macroeconomic coordination (or planning) and economic reforms to integrate and adapt to global economic conditions, and, on the other hand, the need for political decentralization to regulate national issues.²³

However, these phases, in their theoretical explanation, can also be seen as a transition from state to social administration. Treating social property as state property and thus managing it by a rigid state apparatus was an expression of a historically conditioned process, a expression of a revolutionary upheaval,

¹⁹ Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija*. Podgorica 2000, 75.

²⁰ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 1.

²¹ Vladimir Unkovski Korica, *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia*, London-New York 2016, 94.

²² J. Stihoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 97.

²³ *Ibidem*, 94.

as well as the concrete role that property had immediately after the war. The achieved revolutionary transformation then placed the workers' entry into mutual production and socio-economic relations "which are objectively given and must be expressed in the system or order of society" at the center, thus fundamentally redefining the system itself.²⁴

The initiated reforms were confirmed at the 9th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1969, and the hinted changes and very complex procedures of federal, republican, and municipal elections were implemented the same year. Three significant novelties emerged. The Executive Bureau of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was created to ensure the maintenance of some sort of federal political direction in a highly federalized state (1); the party organization of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) gained more influence (party representatives in the military had their congress, and the military gained its representatives in the Party Presidency, which introduced the military to a political level to an unprecedented degree and later became an important element for political calculations at the federal level) (2); and third, rules for the rotation of representatives were implemented (veterans of the revolution were replaced, and a new and younger cadre was introduced, completing the generational turnover in Yugoslav political life) (3).²⁵

Of course, this required the development of new approaches and their implementation throughout the 1970s through a series of new financial instruments.²⁶ It was a first-class job for Edvard Kardelj, who, among other things, conceptualized socialization of past labor, thereby "overcoming the remnants of capitalist relations and the mentality of a wage worker, while simultaneously materially motivating workers to manage and dispose of social capital in a household manner, and successfully manage the entire process of social reproduction."²⁷ The idea that the worker's most immediate management and disposal of past labor, or social capital, completely separates him from wage labor, was central to the thinking of anticapitalistic intellectuals.

The income system was therefore supposed to contribute to the establishment of a fully self-managed system because "income again belongs to the individual worker based on his personal labor, but no longer with means of production in personal ownership, but in conditions of direct and equal joint management of the means of production in common or social ownership"

²⁴ Edvard Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje i društvena svojina*. Drugo izdanje, Beograd 1979, 71.

²⁵ J. Stihoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 122-23.

²⁶ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 157.

²⁷ Edvard Kardelj, *Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja*. Drugo dopunjeno izdanje, Beograd 1978, 135.

which sets it apart (income) from other forms in its socio-historical, class, and socio-economic essence.²⁸

This confirmed that the self-managed worker was the foundation of a utopian socialist society, but only if self-management penetrated all spheres of social life and stimulated political participation and the shaping of a culture of complete political participation, which required the involvement of hundreds of thousands of people in some form of self-management (workers' councils, municipal assemblies, etc.).²⁹ The reformist policy went beyond the workers. Self-management in this phase was programmed for expansion through a wide range of social activities.³⁰ In its theoretical concept, it aimed at “erasing” the state and achieving, however strange it may seem, anarchist communal principles. The desire to expand self-management from participatory worker to integral as a new form of organizing total life was supposed to lead to the demise of the socialist state through mass political and economic participation of workers and citizens.³¹

Education, health care, social, and cultural activities were handed over to autonomous self-management organizations, financed by dedicated tax revenues that previously went to local self-government. Apparently, this development marked the entry of “para-state” organizations onto the Yugoslav scene.³² However, thinking and observing deeper, this phenomenon can actually reveal the long-standing Kidrič's idea (Boris Kidrič 1912-1953) about creating

²⁸ Edvard Kardelj, *Protivrečnosti društvene svojine u savremenoj socijalističkoj praksi. Iz građe za studiju o društvenoj svojini u socijalističkom samoupravljanju*. Treće izdanje, Beograd 1979, 94-95.

²⁹ J. Stilhoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 104.

³⁰ “In the old forms of production relations, the worker was economically independent in relation to other workers: only the class and common economic interest in relation to capital bound him with specific ties of class solidarity with other workers. But at the same time, the worker was economically dependent on the capitalist owner or monopolistic manager of social capital. Now, however, when self-managed workers in associated labor collectively dispose of the means of production, or social capital at various levels of that work, they as a class become independent and free in relation to that capital as their objectified, past labor. Theoretically speaking, a worker could have “full” freedom in terms of disposing of income and its distribution - and still socialist and self-managed relations would be automatically reproduced - only under conditions in which the income of the work organization, or gross income per worker, truly expressed only, as Marx says, the “individual quantum of labor” of that work organization, or that worker, which presupposes some other, not market, form of income acquisition. In other words, this would be possible only under conditions where the work organization and the individual worker, based on the objectively determined individual quantity and quality of their work contained in the products they exchange with other work organizations and workers, automatically acquire a proportional share of the social product. However, the possibilities for objectifying the “individual quantum of labor” practically do not exist. Labor is social, and the worker does not associate in that labor of his own will, but based on the objectively given structure of the productive forces. Simply put, the worker cannot work if he does not associate, that is, he himself is associated by the objectively given and independent of his will social character of labor.” E. Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje i društvena svojina*, 71-72.

³¹ B. Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma*, 84.

³² David A. Dyker, *Yugoslavia. Socialism, Development and Debt*, London-New York 2011, 131.

a holistic self-management system in which the “state apparatus is merely a servant of the working people,” which again testifies to the ideological consistency of its creators throughout this period.³³

Reforms in the areas of planning, prices, finance, and foreign trade had a strong impact on the Yugoslav economy. Abandoning centralized planning and decision-making led to the introduction of self-management at the enterprise level, parallel to the gradual transfer of powers from federal to republican and local political authorities. Supplemented by self-managing coordination mechanisms in the 1970s, the decentralized planning system provided more space for enterprise decisions, thus allowing active participation of economic entities in the overall process.³⁴

Confronting the problem of economic inefficiency was not easy, but the continuation and further deepening of the self-managed market system had no alternative. The reform of 1965 began again as economic and again meant “as Bakarić put it, *a new phase of revolution* and again ultimately led to similar cyclical political-economic consequences.”³⁵ Nevertheless, theoretical advances and the transition from the basis of labor market to the radicalization of decentralized wage distribution to one based on the capital market as an instrument for forming accumulation for investment and income redistribution made these efforts much more serious.

Self-managed socialism, as Kovač asserted, undoubtedly meant “an economically irrational collective idea of the desired social state, based on the strength of political action and ideological construction.”³⁶ As such, and without the necessary tools such as clearly defined ownership and the essential independence of capital, self-management represented a logical inconsistency. Radical advocates of capitalist relations would call it an intellectual mistake.³⁷

Decentralization, as mentioned, led to the creation of autonomous republican approaches, which then created tensions at the political level but also within interethnic relations. Although Branko Horvat spoke of four levels of loyalty (municipality, republic [or region], federation [social community], and global level) that enable a four-step decentralization of state activities in the Yugoslav case (the first three loyalties), this proved impractical.³⁸

The apparent abandonment and resistance to many conceptual solutions of the reform led Croatia and Slovenia to seek changes to the constitution and a new distribution between the republics in 1967 and 1968, while the analysis of the failure of Kraigher's reform led the demand to be made by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia instead of the Federal

³³ V. Unkovski Korica, *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia*, 99.

³⁴ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 199-200.

³⁵ B. Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma*, 81.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, 75.

³⁷ See interesting analysis in: Jesús Huerta de Soto, *Socialism, Economic Calculation and Entrepreneurship*, Cheltenham 2010.

³⁸ Branko Horvat, *Politička ekonomija socijalizma*, Zagreb 1983, 249.

Executive Council, showing that this was essentially a major political problem.³⁹

Strong decentralization, especially in the foreign trade sector when self-managed interest communities for economic relations with foreign countries were established at the republican levels, occurred in the second half of the seventies. Determining import and export quotas for each republic, administrative distribution of foreign exchange within and among republics, privileged access to foreign currency for ultimate exporters, and retaining a significant portion of enterprise foreign exchange earnings in bank accounts even outside Yugoslavia created serious problems.⁴⁰

The concept of integral self-management through practical territorial decentralization was difficult to achieve. Therefore, the political vocabulary increasingly dealt with concepts of agreement and compromise because the institutionalization of these principles (agreement and compromise) meant a “fateful transformation of functional market solutions into a new institutional system of decentralized polycentric contractual self-management economy.”⁴¹ Global trends and changes after the early 1970s led the federal government to guarantee the majority of loans made at lower levels, necessitating internal restructuring. Thus, in 1976, the government split the balance of payments into separate republican accounts (self-managed interest communities for economic relations with foreign countries were established) at the republican level to hold each republic directly accountable for repayment.⁴²

All of this led to the combination of political and economic reforms making the republics almost separate national states, and bureaucratic elites driven by particularistic motives for protectionist measures towards others undermined the long-term development concept, making it very difficult to keep macroeconomic policy on track.⁴³ In addition, uneven regional development was increasing, which did not contribute to political stability and the realization of the principles of negotiation and agreement.

The etatization during de-etatization

The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a revival in the early seventies. Although its status was being reconsidered, particularly intensifying before the recognition of Bosniaks (Muslims) as a nation and their inclusion as a separate national group in the 1971 census,

³⁹ B. Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma*, 83-84.

⁴⁰ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 8.

⁴¹ B. Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma*, 84.

⁴² Susan L. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment. The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945-1990*. New Jersey 1995, 26.

⁴³ J. Stihoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 132-33.

overall social processes were more than dynamic.⁴⁴ Especially in this period, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a loyal follower and implementer of state plans, the course of strengthening the statehood of the Republic within the Federation was advocated. Non-deviating from the reform path was the initial thought, and the adopted course was mostly defended through well-founded economic analysis.

Indeed, this demonstrated that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic was affected by the existing economic system. As an underdeveloped republic, for example, in the period from 1966 to 1970, it contributed 20 billion dinars annually more than what came through the Fund for Underdeveloped Regions, which made no sense.⁴⁵ The question of the effectiveness of such a redistribution system and the contribution each republic managed to achieve was raised.

The development projection of the then-republican leadership was based on how much funding Bosnia and Herzegovina could receive from the Federation Fund, and this case showed that significant changes must occur if underdeveloped areas were to be put on the tracks of progress. For this reason, the social plan of the SFRY for 1971-1975 made a certain revision of this regulation, and the funds received were no longer non-refundable but became loans, seeking to increase the responsibility of republican authorities while also eliminating illogicality. Because of ambitious development plans and desires, it was significant, almost crucial for the Executive Council of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina to gain a better initial position in the Fund.⁴⁶

This problem of underdeveloped areas was difficult to overcome, leading the Federation to seek foreign loans for employment in 1978. A special federal fund for loans to increase employment in economically less developed regions, which was to be based entirely on foreign money directed towards joint investments "where unemployment was high," was established.⁴⁷ Municipal savings institutions, just as they were instructed regarding the collection of private savings (especially from workers abroad), were supposed to play a significant role in the entire process alongside the Fund.

Due to the aforementioned desire to secure a good position within the Fund, the then-president of the Executive Council of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dragutin Kosovac, expressed disagreement with the proposed amendments regarding the economic functions of the Federation. At a session of the Executive Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1971, he said, "Bosnia and Herzegovina disagrees because it is the policy of clearly defined and separate six markets on the one hand, and on the other hand, decisions are made in the Federation without the consent of the republics and provinces,

⁴⁴ Omer Ibrahimagić, *Srpsko osporavanje Bosne i Bošnjaka*, Sarajevo 2001, 65.

⁴⁵ Mustafa Festić, "Sporo otklanjanje osnovnih uzroka stagnacije nerazvijenih područja", *Oslobodenje*, god. XXVIII, br. 8248, Sarajevo, 19. maj 1971, 8-9.

⁴⁶ Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (dalje: ABiH), *Fond Izvršno vijeće Bosne i Hercegovine* (dalje: IV BiH) (1971), 126. i 127. sjednica, 1/71

⁴⁷ S. L. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*, 279.

decided by majorization.”⁴⁸ These two key arguments, in a way, actually showed the contradiction of the overall reform endeavor.

During this year (1971), the foundations were laid for a new development policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it was a pivotal year also because the future organization of the Republic had to be defined from the standpoint of its overall financial position (taxes, funds, etc.).⁴⁹ In the material presented at one of the first sessions of the Executive Council of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Proposal of the republican fund for the faster economic development of underdeveloped areas” outlined the general approach.⁵⁰

The essence of the new orientation, or as most often spoken by republican officials, the “new course,” manifested itself through the process of industrialization and de-agrarization, with an increasingly visible (at least aspired to) strengthening of the secondary and tertiary sectors.⁵¹ Since agriculture represented one of the pillars of the reform policy, it is unclear what was meant by the term de-agrarization at its core and how well thought out it was. However, due to the “new course,” Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to be just a republic with raw material resources and became involved in more complex economic relations within Yugoslavia, which is probably the most significant contribution that can be noticed.

The aforementioned Fund for Underdeveloped Regions, which represented the most significant lever of development policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after substantial changes in its operation and the transfer of political and financial power to the republics, began to perform its function through so-called “the development carriers”.

“The development carriers” were the common denominator for large factories in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had the ability to relocate their capacities outside their home municipality. The “new course” relied on the strength of these factories (“Energoinvest”, RMK Zenica, “Šipad”, “Unioninvest”, “Krivaja”, and others) and implemented a policy of relocating production capacities to underdeveloped areas, thereby providing the necessary jobs for underdeveloped areas and municipalities.⁵²

This was the main and most significant determinant of the efforts of Bosnian-Herzegovinian policy during the seventies, which integrated the work of the Fund into a unified financial operation. Immediately after defining the direction and goals, the Administrative Board of the Chamber of Commerce Sarajevo discussed in early March 1971 the “possibilities of tighter integration

⁴⁸ ABiH, IV BiH (1971), 1/71

⁴⁹ ABiH, IV BiH (1971), 4/71

⁵⁰ ABiH, IV BiH (1971), 2/71

⁵¹ G. autora, *Istorija SK BiH*, 213.

⁵² Admir Mulaosmanović, *Bihačka krajina 1971-1991. Utjecaj politike i političkih elita na privredni razvoj*, Sarajevo 2010, 36.

of large integrated organizations from this area with economic organizations of underdeveloped areas,” thus signaling the task of all economic entities.⁵³

One of the things offered in the aforementioned proposal was the possibility of engaging funds from workers abroad in their places and regions of origin. Initially, the implementation of these initiatives by the political leadership encountered ideological problems. Namely, already at the beginning of 1971, it was realized that representatives of industrial enterprises were hesitant to engage in business with independent craftsmen to avoid being accused of collaboration and assistance to private business.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the authorities noted that stimulating work with their own means would be positive, reducing emigration for work abroad, which was supposed to reduce this psychological barrier. However, it is clear that this was done in a very superficial perception of this phenomenon.

Thus, at the session of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) in early 1973, this was set as one of the primary political goals.⁵⁵ Since the mid-1960s, a large part of the Yugoslav workforce had been in European countries, and by 1973, more than a million people had emigrated, representing between a fifth and a quarter of all actively employed people in Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ The restrictive Emigration Law of 1973 halted migration but did not reduce the large number of Yugoslav workers abroad, as more than a million Yugoslavs lived in other European countries until the late 1980s.

To stop the negative trends, or rather to systematically address this problem, the government decided to implement regionalization so that the Republican Institute for Planning and Economic Research (established in 1971 for the needs of the Republican Executive Council) proposed a model of regionalization into 4 areas (Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, and Banja Luka).⁵⁷ Furthermore, several underdeveloped geographical complexes were identified as factors of underdevelopment (three of them): most of the underdeveloped areas were located at altitudes up to 500m, they were overpopulated and isolated in terms of transportation.⁵⁸

The implementation of such a policy required strong governance due to the specific position of the republic, its desire to rise above backwardness and the burden of interethnic relations, and a series of problems it faced for these reasons. This dynamic also led to accusations from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian leadership of statism because the government, as opponents claimed, did not descend to the local level but “fell” from the level of the Federation to the level

⁵³ “Tribina privrede (Prilog)”, *Oslobođenje*, god. XXVIII, br. 8180, 11. mart 1971, 2.

⁵⁴ ABiH, IV BiH (1971), 2/71

⁵⁵ “Drugo proljeće privredne reforme”, *Oslobođenje*, god. XXX, br. 8933, 16. april 1973, 4.

⁵⁶ J. Stihoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 109.

⁵⁷ ABiH, IV BiH (1971), 7/71

⁵⁸ Ilijas Bošnjović, “Šanse za napredak”, *Oslobođenje*, god. XXVIII, br. 8300, Sarajevo, 10. juli 1971, 4-5.

of the Republic.⁵⁹ It is clear that the critics understood well in which direction the reform should truly go, i.e., that power should not have been retained at the republican level, which is precisely what happened, so the criticism was well theoretically grounded. However, in the specific case, and because of Bosnia and Herzegovina's previous position within the Federation, the "autonomy" that occurred in the early seventies and was sanctioned by the Constitution of 1974 had to prove successful. To achieve this, centralization was necessary.

Therefore, it seemed that there was no possibility of realizing anything without a "firm hand" especially not the fundamental political goal - the social restructuring of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society within Yugoslav socialist self-management decentralization.⁶⁰ In addition to the economic dangers, something even more dangerous was happening to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Politicians representing the Republic in federal institutions testified that since the 5th Congress of the Communist League of Bosnia and Herzegovina (held in 1969), Bosnia and Herzegovina had often been treated by certain colleagues from other republics as Stalinist and undemocratic.⁶¹ The well-known stance of Vladimir Bakarić, then the leader of the SR Croatia, who in 1976 assessed that Bosnia and Herzegovina faced a big challenge it could not handle due to the firmness of its government and its "lecturing" to others, corresponded to these assessments made by Bosnians.⁶²

The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 indeed resulted from a broadly set negotiation concept and compromise between various regional political and economic interests, serving as a logical continuation of the reform process related to self-management (agreement and consensus). With this constitution, Yugoslavia was thoroughly federalized, ensuring that all decisions could be made at the republican or provincial level, leaving only foreign policy, defense, security, and some macroeconomic functions at the federal level.⁶³ It was precisely through this Constitution, as the last attempt at political gathering and maintaining the South Slavs under one umbrella, that political and economic processes were shaped during the last fifteen years of the existence of the common state.

In analyzing the implementation of its own policy in 1978, at the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political leadership positively evaluated the "new course." Branko Mikulić, the then-president of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proudly emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina had become equal and independent in

⁵⁹ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, 44, 45, 46, 48. i 49. sjednica CK SK BiH, knjiga 2 /septembar-novembar 1972/, Sarajevo 1977, 15-16.

⁶⁰ G. autora, *Istorija SK BiH*, 213.

⁶¹ Arhiv Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine (dalje: AFBiH), Fond MB (dalje: MB), 311/87.

⁶² A. Mulaosmanović, *Bihaćka krajina 1971-1991*, 39.

⁶³ J. Stihoff Sørensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery*, 130.

managing its own development policy.⁶⁴ However, something that was not achieved but was part of the program orientation was the balanced development of all areas of the Republic.⁶⁵ The relocation and construction of production capacities in underdeveloped areas had initial effects, but beyond that, by the end of the seventies, it could not be discerned, and the republican leadership was aware of that.

At the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1982), similar views were reiterated on policies that yielded certain results, with particular emphasis placed on the dispersion of production capacities of large companies in underdeveloped areas, which led to progress in several municipalities.⁶⁶ A significant contribution to such developments from the mid-seventies was given by giving priority to agriculture and elevating it to a higher level of processing (developing tertiary activities).⁶⁷ This, of course, also testified to the aforementioned dubious process of de-agrarization.

Certainly, a problem in the implementation of the plans of the political leadership was the outflow of young people from rural areas, so in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agricultural population decreased from 50% in 1961 to 37% in 1971.⁶⁸ Internal migration and emigration were very active and testified to the existence of a vicious circle of unemployment, underdevelopment, and the difficult transformation of peasants into workers because about 500,000 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina were affected by migration during the period 1961-1971, of which 150,000 were abroad.⁶⁹

These data provide a clearer picture when it comes to the policies of utilizing funds from workers abroad as investment tools for the development of agriculture in the regions they come from because this would ensure a double benefit, money, and workers. When it comes to total investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicators for the period 1947-1979 show that 65% of funds were invested in industry, 13.3% in roads, 8% in trade and hospitality, and 5% in agriculture.⁷⁰ Agriculture was seen as an important factor in future development, but, as in most socialist countries and in Yugoslavia, it did not follow the right path.

The stance on the need to integrate rural populations into party structures through agricultural activities was expressed repeatedly, confirming

⁶⁴ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, *Sedmi kongres SK BiH. Dokumenti*, Sarajevo 1978, 22.

⁶⁵ CK SK BiH, *Sedmi kongres SK BiH*, 1978, 33.

⁶⁶ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, *Osmi kongres SK BiH. Dokumenti*, Sarajevo 1982, 10.

⁶⁷ *Sedmi kongres SK BiH*, 1978, 37-38.

⁶⁸ Vlaho Bubica, "Agrarna politika i migracije", *Oslobođenje*, god. XXX, br. 8868, 10. februar 1973, 5-6.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰ *Statistički godišnjak 1982. Društveno ekonomski razvoj opština SFRJ*, knjiga 1, Beograd 1982, 103-156.

Kardelj's postulates of the last self-management reform effort.⁷¹ Perhaps it is precisely in this dichotomy and the response to the ambiguity of de-agrarization. By creating and transforming peasants into socialist workers, the bearers of overall social change, statuses necessarily changed, although the plan was different. De-agrarization aimed at social change while keeping economic activities essentially agricultural. Everything remained at the level of declaration and ideological inclinations because the realities of life were quite different from the desires and plans of official politics.

Summary

From the formation of socialist Yugoslavia to its dissolution, a continuous process of economic adjustments and the search for a model that would reconcile socialist (communist) theory and practice with the challenges posed by the geopolitical reality after Second World War has been underway. As Kardelj pointed out, this sometimes led to wandering, difficulties, and deformations that accompanied the development of self-management, especially due to the pressure of the “property tradition” of the previous society. The influential division from the Yalta Conference certainly had a significant impact on Yugoslav political maneuvers, although we will not delve into that aspect here.

In an effort to preserve Britain's position in the Mediterranean, British Prime Minister Churchill proposed a division of influence in Eastern Europe, expressed in percentages on a piece of paper, during a meeting in Moscow in October 1944. He suggested 90% British influence in Greece, 90% Soviet influence in Romania, 75% Soviet influence in Bulgaria, and a 50/50 split for both Yugoslavia and Hungary.⁷² Such a division of influence created a kind of uniqueness for Yugoslavia and the region that could resemble a European “buffer zone” situated between two blocs. The entire history of socialist Yugoslavia, whether it be its economic and social model or its international position (such as the Non-Aligned Movement), testified to this.

Therefore, the argument that a country of great diversity, such as Yugoslavia, never posed the construction of an efficient economic system as its fundamental political-economic issue, but rather saw it as a matter of achieving political integration through its federative institutional structure, holds significant value. Simply put, political integration had to be achieved, even if it meant economic disintegration, partly due to broader established global geopolitical leverages. Indeed, it was attempted to show in this text that it is possible to view the reform efforts of the Yugoslav government in this way.

⁷¹ AFBiH, MB, (1974-1975), 250/74

⁷² More about it in: Plokhy, M. Serhii (2014) *Yalta. The price of peace*. London: Penguin Books i Preston, Diana (2019) *Eight Days at Yalta. How Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World*. London: Picador.

In this regard, Woodward's stance that the key element of Yugoslav uniqueness was not the system of workers' self-management or its multinational state, but its international position – its attempt to maintain socialism at home and vigilant national independence while being open to the world economy, which required constant adjustments in labor utilization and employment organization – confirms its tailored fate towards the end of the Second World War.⁷³

Kovač's interpretation perhaps best describes all the efforts of the Yugoslav regime.

Yugoslav communists in 1958, in the new program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, promoted changes and the rejection of tradition, creating an unusual "tradition of change." In such circumstances, the political-economic debate focused on what contemporary Yugoslav economists called the economic system, while its constant shaping became the main concern of economic policy. Continuous changes in the economic system, called economic reforms, were the way the Yugoslav economy functioned. Economic policy essentially meant an endless series of reorganizations and the search for a suitable economic system. Behind these constant institutional changes was always political interest and the struggle for the distribution of power within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.⁷⁴

From all that has been stated, self-management, in its basic economic functioning, should be seen as an undertaking in which command tools are minimized, but political methods are used to reduce the power of directors in favor of the restoration of the social hierarchy with the party and the state at the top.⁷⁵ In this way, the logical inconsistency is confirmed, which is contained in the fact that the state could never remain just a servant of the working people within such a system, but always an unquestionable master, regardless of the perhaps sincere desire of the creators for it not to be so.

The continuous subjection of enterprises to state tutelage was of great significance because they served the realization of other socialist goals. Therefore, the causes of the economic crisis should be sought in the systemic characteristics of the socio-political model in general, rather than in the specific characteristic of the Yugoslav economy. Self-management can be viewed as a reformist ideal, similar to the ideals of Western social democracy, which progressively moved away from the model of unrestrained raw capitalism. However, as such, it did not have the opportunity to be implemented in Yugoslavia due to the unwillingness of the centers of power (the Party) to relinquish their authority to the workers.⁷⁶

⁷³ S. L. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*, 28.

⁷⁴ B. Kovač, *Politička ekonomija reformiranja samoupravnog socijalizma*, 79.

⁷⁵ V. Unkovski Korica, *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito's Yugoslavia*, 86.

⁷⁶ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 214.

From the late 1960s, Yugoslavia began to function like Western countries with a clear federal structure, which can be attributed to a much more serious structuring and theoretical discussion of the system (as Kovač also noted), but contradictions were evident in practice. Some republics simply became selfish, and functioning within the federation boiled down to republics positioning themselves better and siphoning funds from the Federal Fund, gradually becoming the main political characteristic of regional/republican elites.⁷⁷ This led to competitive rivalry between projects that aligned with the borders of the republics (and provinces), widening the gap between them.

Nevertheless, without the decision to introduce self-management in the early 1950s, which actually initiated (and thus facilitated) the long process of economic reforms, many institutional changes in Yugoslavia probably would not have been introduced, at least not so early. On the other hand, such reforms brought a higher level of general welfare to Yugoslavs compared to citizens of other socialist countries, which should be viewed in the context of the country's defined position as "somewhere in-between."

Because of all the aforementioned, the result of the second "Kraigher Commission" (1983) could not have been significant because the economy still remained in the same positions it had throughout the entire period of socialist Yugoslavia. The changes that were supposed to occur implied substantial cuts, which this commission did not foresee or offer as a solution. A non-democratic society and a market economy without clear ownership titles in labor were not treated as hindrances to the economy by this commission, which was actually the fundamental flaw that needed to be addressed.

In such a created system, the gray area within which significant processes could take place became significant. For example, the influence of numerous local companies (Agrokomerc, Željezara Smederevo, etc) can precisely show how great that influence could be and how much the actions of the most significant centers of power actually undermined the concept they supposedly painstakingly established for so long.

The mechanisms of economic regulation precisely provided the possibility of transferring social goals and interests to individual enterprises (usually through the local community), so the state's interference in the microeconomic sphere in Yugoslavia no longer occurred through regulations, plans, and norms but through policy guidelines (established by social contracts) that had to be respected.⁷⁸ Thus, state interference became indirect and happened through recommendations, informal persuasions, and simple 'advice' from local political officials, while the persistence of state paternalism in Yugoslavia was ensured by the unchanged ownership regime.

⁷⁷ Maria Ewa Szatlach, Regionalna politika u Jugoslaviji i Poljskoj posle Drugog svetskog rata. Sličnosti i razlike. *Jugoslavija i Poljska: odnosi u XX veku*, Zbornik radova, Beograd 2022, 401.

⁷⁸ M. Uvalic, *Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia*, 59.

The Bosnian-Herzegovinian party leadership recognized and discussed this problem. Already in the late 1970s, specifically at the 7th Congress of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina (May 1978), this phenomenon was debated, but nothing concrete was done to prevent further development.⁷⁹ Several years later, within the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, serious questions were raised about the occurrences of “subjectivism and placing the interests of one's own environment ahead of general interests, localisms, and local potentates and municipal structures in collusion with techno-bureaucratic structures.”⁸⁰ All of this, in a way, spoke of the existence of a parallel structure that, outside the already established decentralization system, implemented certain significant political and economic projects without the republican leadership being aware of it. At least a huge part of those who thought they were policy makers. And of course, all of this confirmed the need for a serious revision of self-management, which did not occur until the second half of the 1980s when Yugoslavia was already becoming a disappearing state.

Zaključak

Od nastanka socijalističke Jugoslavije pa do njenog nestanka jedan proces je tekao kontinuirano. Radi se o ekonomskim prilagodbama i traženju modela koji bi spojio socijalističku (komunističku) misao i praksu sa zahtjevima koje je pred vlast stavljala realnost geopolitičke pozicije nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. To je, kako je kazao Kardelj, dovelo i do određena lutanja, teškoće i deformacije koje su pratile razvoj samoupravljanja, a javljale su se prije svega zbog neprekidnog pritiska “svojinske tradicije“ starog društva. Koliko je interesna podjela sa Jalte utjecala na ovo jugoslavensko laviranje nije tema ovoga radi ali sigurno daje veoma vrijedan kontekst ukupnom djelovanju režima u Beogradu.

Naime, u želji da očuva britansku poziciju u Sredozemlju britanski premijer Churchill je još u Moskvi (oktobar 1944) predložio podjelu utjecaja u istočnoj Europi na komadu papira i izraženo u postocima, sugerirajući 90% britanskog utjecaja u Grčkoj, 90% sovjetskog utjecaja u Rumunjskoj, 75% sovjetskog utjecaja u Bugarskoj i 50/50 za obje zemlje u Jugoslaviji i Mađarskoj“. Ovakva podjela utjecaja kreirala je svojevrsnu posebnost Jugoslavije i prostora koji bi mogao ličiti europskoj “buffer zoni“ smještenoj između dva bloka. Čitava historija socijalističke Jugoslavije, govorilo se o njenom ekonomskom i društvenom modelu ili poziciji na međunarodnoj sceni (Nesvrstani), tome će snažno doprinosti.

⁷⁹ G. autora, *Istorija SK BiH*, 211.

⁸⁰ Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, *Izbor iz dokumenata SK BiH*, knjiga 1, Sarajevo 1986, 24 -25.

Zbog toga i argument da zemlja velikih različitosti, kakva je bila Jugoslavija, kao osnovno političko-ekonomsko pitanje nikada, dakle, nije postavila izgradnju efikasnog ekonomskog sistema već je to bilo pitanje postizanja političke integracije kroz njezinu federativnu institucionalnu strukturu ima veliku vrijednost. Prosto kazano, politička integracija se morala postići pa makar i ekonomskom dezintegracijom, a dobrim dijelom zbog širih uspostavljenih svjetskih geopolitičkih poluga. Da je, doista, moguće i na ovaj način gledati na reformske poteze jugoslavenske vlasti nastojalo se pokazati i u ovom tekstu.

S tim u vezi i stav Woodwardove da ključni element jugoslavenske izuzetnosti nije bio sistem radničkog samoupravljanja zemlje ili njena multinacionalna država, već njen međunarodni položaj – njen pokušaj da zadrži socijalizam kod kuće i budnu nacionalnu nezavisnost dok je bio otvoren prema svjetskoj ekonomiji, što je zahtijevalo stalna prilagođavanja u korištenju rada i organizaciji zapošljavanja potvrđuje njenu skrojenu sudbinu pri kraju Drugog svjetskog rada.

Jedno tumačenje koje je ponudio Kovač možda i nabolje opisuje sve te napore režima

Jugoslavenski su komunisti 1958. godine, u novom programu SKJ, kao primarni društveni zadatak promovirali promjene i odbacivanje tradicije, tako da je za čitavu povijest socijalističke Jugoslavije karakteristična neobična “tradicija promjene”. U takvim je okolnostima političko-ekonomska diskusija bila usredotočena na ono što su onodobni jugoslavenski ekonomisti nazivali ekonomskim sistemom, dok je njegovo pomalo vječno izgrađivanje postalo glavnom preokupacijom ekonomske politike. Problemi s ekonomskim ciklusima, strateškim usmjeravanjem države i mjerama različitih ekonomskih politika jednostavno su se rješavali tako što se uvijek iznova mijenjao sam institucionalni okvir. Stalne promjene privrednog sistema, nazivane ekonomskim reformama, bile su dakle način operativnog funkcioniranja tadašnje privrede. Ekonomska politika značila je samo beskrajn niz reorganizacija i traženja pogodnog privrednog sistema. Naravno da je u pozadini tih stalnih promjena institucija uvijek bio politički interes i borba za raspodjelu moći između različitih frakcija SKJ (...)

Zbog svega navedenog samoupravljanje, u onom njegovom osnovnom ekonomskom funkcioniranju, se treba sagledavati kao poduhvat unutar kojeg se minimiziraju komandni alati ali se koriste političke metode s ciljem oduzimanja moći direktorima u korist obnove društvene hijerarhije s partijom i državom na vrhu. Time je, zapravo, potvrđena i ona logička nekonzistentnost, a koja je sadržana u činjenici da država nikada nije mogla unutar takvog sistema ostati samo sluga radnom narodu već uvijek i neupitno njegov gospodar bez obzira na možda i iskrenu želju kreatora da to tako ne bude.

Kontinuirano podvrgavanje državnom tutorstvu preduzeća, dakle, bilo je od veliko značaja jer su služila ostvarivanju i drugih socijalističkih ciljeva

tako da se uzroke ekonomske krize treba tražiti u sistemskim karakteristikama društveno-političkog modela općenito, a ne u specifičnoj karakteristikama jugoslavenske privrede. Samoupravljanje se može promatrati kao reformistički ideal, sličnog idealima zapadne socijaldemokratije koji su progresivnim modificiranjem pravili odmak od modela neobuzdanog sirovog kapitalizma ali kao takvo ipak nije imalo priliku biti provedeno u Jugoslaviji zbog nesprenosti centara moći (Partije) da svoju vlast prepusti radnicima.

Od kraja šezdesetih godina Jugoslavija jeste počela djelovati kao zapadne države sa jasnim federalnim uređenjem, što se može pripisati dosta ozbiljnijoj strukturalizaciji i teorijskoj raspravi o sistemu (kako je i Kovač napomenuo) ali u praksi su se nazirale suprotnosti. Pojedine republike su, naprosto postajale egoistične, a funkcionisanje u okviru federacije se svodilo na republičko bolje pozicioniranje i crpenje sredstava iz Federalnog fonda što je postepeno postajala glavna politička karakteristika regionalnih/republičkih elita. Naravno da je to vodilo u konkurentsko nadmetanje između projekata koji su se podudarali sa granicama republika (i pokrajina) čime je jaz između istih rastao.

Ipak, da nije bilo odluke o uvođenju samoupravljanja početkom 1950-ih, koja je zapravo pokrenula (a time i olakšala) dugi proces ekonomskih reformi, mnoge institucionalne promjene u Jugoslaviji vjerojatno ne bi bile uvedene, barem ne tako rano. S druge strane, takve su reforme donijele višu razinu općeg blagostanja Jugoslavena u usporedbi s građanima drugih socijalističkih zemalja što se treba sagledavati u kontekstu one definirane pozicije zemlje “negdje između“.

Zbog svega izrečenog isto tako rezultat druge “Kraigherove komisije“ (1983) zapravo nije mogao biti osobit jer je privreda i dalje ostala na istim onim pozicijama koje je imala u čitavom razdoblju socijalističke Jugoslavije. Promjene koje su se trebale desiti podrazumijevale su suštinske rezove što ova komisija nije predvidjela i ponudila kao rješenje. Nedemokratsko društvo i tržišna ekonomija koja nema jasne titulare vlasništva u radu ove komisije nisu tretirani kao kočničari privrede što je, zapravo, temeljni nedostatak koji se morao ukloniti.

U jednom takvom kreiranom sistemu siva zona unutar koje su se mogle odvijati i najznačajniji procesi postajala je značajnom. Na primjeru mnoštva lokanih kompanija (Agrokomerc, Željezara Smederevo itd.) se sasvim egzaktno može pokazati koliko je taj utjecaj mogao biti velik i koliko je, zapravo, djelovanje najznačajnijih centara moći dezavuiralo koncept koji su, navodno, mukotrpno uspostavljali tako dugo.

Mehanizmi ekonomske regulacije upravo su davali mogućnost prijenosa društvenih ciljeva i interesa na pojedino poduzeće (obično se vrši preko lokalne zajednice) tako da se uplitanje države u mikroekonomsku sferu u Jugoslaviji više nije odvijao kroz propise, planove i norme već preko smjernica politike (utvrđene društvenim ugovorima) koje se moraju poštivati. Time je uplitanje države postalo neizravno, a događalo se preporukama, neformalnim

uvjeravanjima i prostim 'savjetima' od strane lokalnih političkih dužnosnika dok je opstojnost državnog paternalizma u Jugoslaviji osiguravao nepromijenjeni vlasnički režim.

Bosanskohercegovački partijski vrh je uočavao i razgovarao o ovom problemu. Još krajem sedamdesetih godina, tačnije na Sedmom kongresu SK Bosne i Hercegovine (maj, 1978) se raspravljalo o ovom fenomenu ali nije ništa konkretno urađeno na sprječavanju daljnjeg razvoja. Nekoliko godina kasnije unutar CK SK Bosne i Hercegovine se vrlo ozbiljno postavilo pitanje o pojavama "subjektivizma i stavljanju interesa vlastite sredine ispred općih interesa, lokalizmima i lokalnim moćnicima i općinskim strukturama koje su u sprezi sa tehno-birokratskim strukturama". Sve ovo je na određeni način govorilo o postojanju paralelne strukture koja mimo ionako uspostavljenog sistema decentralizacije provodi određene značajne političke i privredne projekte, a da republička rukovodstva toga nisu bila niti svjesna. Barem ogroman dio onih koji su mislili da su kreatori politika. I naravno, sve ovo je potvrđivalo potrebu za ozbiljnom revizijom samoupravljanja do koje nije došlo sve do druge polovine osamdesetih godina kada je Jugoslavija ionako postajala država koja nestaje.

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